Four families of moral theory, the famous arguments that ground them, and the famous counter-examples that haunt them. Plus the trolley.
What does "good" mean? Are moral facts real? Cognitivism vs non-cognitivism; realism vs anti-realism; Mackie's error theory; Hume's is-ought; Moore's open question.
The big four families: virtue, deontology, consequentialism, contractualism. This deck lives mostly here.
Bioethics, animal ethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, the ethics of war. Theory meets the world.
Most working philosophers are not partisans of one family. They borrow. Modern virtue ethicists use a Kantian "respect" when they like; consequentialists adopt rule formulations to mute their counter-examples. The families are useful precisely because they pull in different directions. Thinking ethically, in part, is learning to feel the pulls.
Origin. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Revived in the twentieth century by G. E. M. Anscombe ("Modern Moral Philosophy," 1958), Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue, 1981), Rosalind Hursthouse.
Don't ask "what is the right action?" — ask "what kind of person should I be?" Right action flows from a stable character (virtue), trained by habit, exercised with practical wisdom (phronesis), aimed at flourishing (eudaimonia).
| Deficiency | Virtue | Excess |
|---|---|---|
| cowardice | courage | rashness |
| insensibility | temperance | self-indulgence |
| stinginess | liberality | prodigality |
| sullenness | good temper | irascibility |
| shamelessness | modesty | bashfulness |
Virtue ethics tells you to do as the virtuous person would do — which is unhelpful when you don't know one, and circular when you do.
Origin. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Critique of Practical Reason (1788). Modern descendants: Korsgaard, O'Neill.
Kant offers several formulations, intended to be equivalent.
Could "lie when convenient" be willed as a universal law? No: if everyone lied freely, the very practice of saying-so would collapse, and lying would lose its point. Lying contradicts itself when universalised. So it is forbidden.
Captures something real: the moral significance of intentions and persons. Why slavery is wrong does not seem to be about the math of total utility; it is about treating humans as means.
Rigorism. Difficulty handling conflicts of duty. The "universalisability" test is doing more work than the procedure can carry.
Origin. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789); J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1861). Modern descendants: Singer, Parfit, Railton.
An action is right insofar as it tends to promote happiness; wrong insofar as it tends to promote the reverse. (Mill, Utilitarianism, ch. 2)
If I can prevent something very bad without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, utilitarianism says I am required to do so. Singer's "Famine, Affluence and Morality" (1972) draws the consequence: most of us are morally required to give vastly more to effective charities than we do.
Impartial, scalable, naturalistic. Animal welfare, public health, cost-benefit thinking — all live here.
Origin. Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651), Locke, Rousseau (The Social Contract, 1762). Twentieth-century revival: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice, 1971), T. M. Scanlon (What We Owe to Each Other, 1998).
Right principles are those no one could reasonably reject — or, in another version, those that would be agreed to under appropriate idealised conditions.
Imagine choosing the principles of justice for your society without knowing who you will be in it — your gender, race, talents, wealth, or even your conception of the good. From behind this veil, Rawls argues, you would choose:
An act is wrong if it would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement. (What We Owe, p.153) The book's title gives its scope.
Connects ethics to political philosophy. Captures the idea that morality is essentially a matter of justification to others.
Philippa Foot devised the original case in a 1967 essay on abortion and double effect; Judith Jarvis Thomson sharpened the variants in 1976 and 1985. The problem is not a "gotcha." It is a precision tool for separating moral intuitions.
A runaway trolley will kill five. You can throw a switch to divert it to a side track, where it will kill one. Most people say: throw the switch. Net lives saved: four.
Why the asymmetry? Consequentialism predicts identical answers to both. Deontology, with the doctrine of double effect, can distinguish: in Footbridge, the stranger's death is the means; in Switch, it is a side effect.
| Question | Virtue | Deontology | Consequentialism | Contractualism |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Right-making feature | What a virtuous agent would do | Whether the maxim can be universalised | Whether the act produces best outcomes | Whether the principle is unrejectable |
| Aim | Eudaimonia (flourishing) | Acting from duty | Maximise good | Mutual justification |
| Core text | Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics | Kant, Groundwork (1785) | Mill, Utilitarianism (1861) | Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) |
| Strength | Realistic about character | Respect for persons | Impartial, scalable | Connects ethics to politics |
| Weakness | What about cases? | Rigorism, conflicts | Can demand the unthinkable | Idealisation does work |
| Famous case | Mentor in moral exemplar tradition | Constant's murderer at the door | The sheriff who frames the innocent | The veil of ignorance |
Bentham: "The question is not, can they reason? nor can they talk? but can they suffer?" Singer's Animal Liberation (1975) launched the movement.
Beauchamp & Childress's Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1979): autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, justice. Ground rules of clinical decision-making.
Aldo Leopold's land ethic; Arne Næss's deep ecology; Dale Jamieson on climate. Are obligations only to humans, or to the biosphere itself?
Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria, Walzer. Jus ad bellum (when to fight), jus in bello (how), jus post bellum (after). Civilians, proportionality, double effect.
Friedman's shareholder doctrine; Freeman's stakeholder theory; corporate moral agency; whistleblowing; the ethics of advertising.
Algorithmic fairness, AI alignment, surveillance, the gig economy. Old principles meeting genuinely new affordances.
"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author... all of a sudden... instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not." (Treatise III.i.1, 1739)
You cannot derive an ought from an is alone. Without some normative premise, no normative conclusion. Modern ethical naturalists try to bridge this; non-cognitivists embrace it.
Suppose someone defines "good" as "what we desire to desire," or "what produces pleasure." We can always intelligibly ask: but is what we desire to desire good? Is pleasure good? If so, says Moore (Principia Ethica, 1903), the definition has not captured "good."
Moral judgments purport to be objective. Nothing in the world makes them objectively true. So they are systematically false — though useful. (Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, 1977.)
Justitia, blindfolded, holding scales. The blindfold is medieval; the scales are older; the sword (often present, here imagined) is older still. Ethics is older than any of its images. The images persist because the underlying problem — how to weigh, fairly, the claims of different beings — does.
| Author | Work | Year | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | Nicomachean Ethics | c. 340 BCE | foundational virtue text |
| Aquinas | Summa Theologiae II | 1265–74 | natural law tradition |
| Hobbes | Leviathan | 1651 | contractualism, modern |
| Hume | An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals | 1751 | sentimentalism |
| Kant | Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals | 1785 | categorical imperative |
| Bentham | Introduction to the Principles of Morals & Legislation | 1789 | classical utilitarianism |
| Mill | Utilitarianism | 1861 | qualitative refinement |
| Moore | Principia Ethica | 1903 | open-question argument |
| Anscombe | "Modern Moral Philosophy" | 1958 | essay, revives virtue |
| Foot | "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect" | 1967 | original trolley |
| Rawls | A Theory of Justice | 1971 | contractualist liberalism |
| Singer | "Famine, Affluence and Morality" | 1972 | demanding utilitarianism |
| Mackie | Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong | 1977 | error theory |
| MacIntyre | After Virtue | 1981 | diagnosis of modern moral discourse |
| Williams | Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy | 1985 | famous critique of "the moral system" |
| Scanlon | What We Owe to Each Other | 1998 | contractualism, refined |
| Parfit | On What Matters (3 vols.) | 2011, 2017 | convergence of major theories |
Wireless Philosophy (Wi-Phi) has a free curriculum on each of the major theories. Crash Course Philosophy spends roughly half its run on ethics. The embed below is a starting point; each platform has many more.
Watch · Wireless Philosophy · Ethics
Watch · Crash Course Philosophy · Ethics
There is no view from nowhere; but there is a view that takes everyone into account, and that is the moral view.
— with apologies to Thomas Nagel